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A couple of months ago a colleague mentioned that he had been asked to present a paper at an 
academic conference whose theme was "Is There Still a 'West'?" This is undoubtedly a legitimate 
problem for European and American scholars worried about the recent fraying of the trans-
Atlantic bond. Yet it is safe to say the question would never have occurred to someone who was 
Chinese, Arab, or African. Throughout the length and breadth of Europe's old imperia, the reality 
of the West is not seriously in dispute. For Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, however, the 
continued preponderance of Western influence around the world is of less concern than the 
images and emotions that influence has stimulated among those who have perceived the West 
as an unwelcome presence. Among the flood of recent books purporting to provide a skeleton 
key to the contemporary security environment, their slim volume stands out by virtue of its 
insistence upon the complexity of the lock. They lay a large share of the world's troubles at the 
feet of a pernicious ideology they call "Occidentalism," by which the core values of the West have 
been traduced in the minds of its enemies. This distorted image has in turn inflamed the hatreds 
that, over the last two centuries, have fueled resistance to the spread of liberal and democratic 
ideas. The current mess, they conclude, is neither a clash of civilizations nor the accidental 
product of recent policy mistakes, but a reflection of old and stubborn misapprehensions about 
what the West stands for, and what it wants. 
These misapprehensions first arose in Europe itself, an observation of considerable importance, 
albeit one that reveals the book's title for what it is: a marketing concept rather than an analytic 
tool. The real subject of the authors' reflections is not the West as a historical reality but 
modernity as a complex of ideas, attitudes, and practices. For them the "West" is any place 
where modernity—here broadly synonymous with limited, responsible government and a respect 
for individual rights and scientific rationality—has prevailed. Occidentalists are those, wherever 
situated, who have found the modern to be intolerably corrosive of traditional values: decadent, 
rootless, alienated, materialist, morally soft, and spiritually bereft. Such people arose first in the 
West, because it was there that the challenges of modernity were first experienced. 
Today they can be found literally everywhere. What to make of this is a good question, to which 
Buruma and Margalit offer a firm, if not entirely convincing answer. They argue that Occidentalists 
are connected by a common intellectual descent, extending back to European romantic critics of 
the Enlightenment, and passing into our own time through a variety of fascist, communist, and 
religious conservative movements, while spreading around the world as part of the baggage of 
European imperialism. The history of Occidentalism is thus one of "cross-contamination, the 
spread of bad ideas." (149) This proposition requires a good deal more evidence than the authors 
adduce. It is certainly worth noticing that, up to a point, the German Romantics, Hitler, the 
Ayatollah Khomeini, Franz Fanon, Tojo, the Slavophiles, Osama bin Laden, and Mao (among 
others), all expressed their contempt for modernity in similar terms. But that is scarcely sufficient 
to demonstrate that they acquired their ideas from each other, nor to mitigate the obvious 
practical and ideological differences among them. 
This is not a book to withstand the close scrutiny of academic experts but then it does not really 
invite that scrutiny. It is not organized to unfold the genealogy of Occidentalism, but rather to 
display crucial elements of its taxonomy, as manifest by a perennial preoccupation with a few 
recurring themes: the decadence and alienation of urban life; the pervasive reliance of modern 
societies on competitive markets to mediate human relationships; their hubristic faith in rationality 
and scientific reasoning; and their corresponding disdain for spiritual, aristocratic, and religious 
values, which always take second place to the pursuit of material comfort. These have been 
imagined, across an impressively wide range of time and circumstance, to reveal the corrupt 
essence of "the West" in its modern guise.  
It is a picture well calculated to give pause to those who conceive the current struggle with radical 
Islamism in strictly tactical terms, as "war on terror," and also those who have been too quick to 
conclude that the world has been made altogether new by recent events. The global and 
historical unity of Occidentalism, as presented here, resides chiefly in shared resentments, and in 
the common rhetorical strategies that these have engendered. It is above all an ideology of 
disappointment, heightened as often as not by nostalgia for an imaginary past. Nevertheless, one 
is inclined to wonder whether the germinal experience of modernization in the West can really 
have been quite the same as it has been elsewhere. Those Europeans who first recoiled from the 
idea of the modern in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were at least confronting an 
organic, if bitterly despised, development within their own societies. Even granting that modernity 
is synonymous with what the rest of the world means by "the West," the fact remains that rest of 
the world has not encountered the West simply as a moral challenge to received ideas, but as a 
material force of immense coercive power. Whatever resentments the West's enemies may 
harbor have something to do with how that power has been employed, and represented 
symbolically. It is surprising that Buruma and Margalit, taking note of the great metropolises of 
Asia, should propose that, to the extent that those cities represent an Occidentalist rejoinder to 
the corrupt urbanism of the West, they "celebrate power instead of freedom." (46) Anyone who 
supposes that the skyline of lower Manhattan does not symbolize power is going to have a hard 
time understanding why the Twin Towers should have become the objects of such lethal violence. 
It is also puzzling, or at any rate disheartening, that Occidentalism should have persisted intact 
for so long in the face of accumulating experience of what modern societies are really like. 
European military officers in the nineteenth century were drawn disproportionately from pre-
industrial agrarian elites, and they were inclined to worry that modernization and city life had 
undermined the fighting spirit of their armies. They suspected that proletarian workers were too 
radicalized and deracinated to be good soldiers, and they doubted that the commercial middle 
class, so caught up with getting and spending, could provide satisfactory officers. This, needless 
to say, was a strategic miscalculation of some significance, but those who made it at least had 
the excuse of having lived in ignorance. This is no longer the case. Buruma and Margalit quite 
properly take for granted that Occidentalism is not a set of "ideas," but of illusions, and they waste 
no time trying to prove that those who harbor them are wrong: that city life is not dehumanizing, 
that the bourgeoisie is not spiritually dead, that Western women are not whores, or that modern 
soldiers are not cowards. Nor, for that matter, do they attempt to trace the chain of reasoning (if 
that is the word) by which Occidentalists have periodically concluded that Western civilization is 
on its last legs. Buruma and Margalit are both university professors (at Bard College and the 
Hebrew University, respectively), and if there is one thing all professors know, it is that it is not 
easy to change people's minds simply by acquainting them with the facts. 
The imperviousness of Occidentalism to information and experience is undoubtedly its most 
troubling characteristic. The modern West puts great stock in the power of argument, and when it 
fails it is hard to know what to do. The problem is compounded by the West's routine failure to live 
up to its professed ideals and by the fact that, however wrong the West's enemies may be about 
the details, they are right that the inherited practices and prescribed hierarchies of traditional 
societies do not survive prolonged contact with those ideals—at least they do not survive 
sufficiently intact to satisfy the fantasies of Occidentalists. The core principles of political freedom, 
religious tolerance, scientific reason, and individual rights that they find so dangerous are 
dangerous precisely because their appeal is not culturally specific. The connection of "the 
modern" to "the West" is crucial, but it is also historically contingent. The love of liberty is not the 
same as a taste for cricket, foie gras, or large, gas-guzzling automobiles. If it were, the modern 
would be no threat to anyone. 
Buruma and Margalit conclude with some mild, Tocquevillian ironies. They caution that, despite 
the preponderant role of Western imperialism in creating the contemporary world, the West 
should not feel too guilty about having somehow fostered the barbarism of its adversaries, for to 
do so would be to assume that those outside the ambit of modernity are basically children, 
incapable of taking responsibility for their own actions. They also warn against the temptation to 
"fight fire with fire." "We cannot afford to close our societies as a defense against those who have 
closed theirs," as they say, because "then we would all become Occidentalists, and there would 
be nothing left to defend." (148-49) 
The latter point looks sharper if it is viewed from the other side. The self-restraint of the West is 
today the chief strategic resource of its enemies, who persist in believing in its weakness and 
decadence in part because of its reluctance to use the overwhelming power at its disposal. When 
a suicide bomber detonates himself at a Jerusalem bus stop, he knows that he (and others) will 
die, and also that some form of retaliation will be visited upon his comrades: a few buildings will 
be bulldozed, a few big-wigs assassinated. Jihadi firing from a mosque in Falluja know that if the 
mosque is destroyed they too will die but they accept the risk because they imagine that the 
destruction of a sacred building will dramatize their enemy's lack of spirituality. Neither considers 
that the price of their action might include, for instance, the systemic torture and execution of 
every living soul in the towns where they were born. Yet such things have happened: the jihadi of 
Falluja did not rise up against Saddam Hussein because they knew perfectly well that retribution 
of inconceivable brutality would follow. There is, in other words, a point at which strategies 
calculated merely to "heighten the contradictions" become self-defeating. The eclipse of 
liberalism in the West, should it occur, would quite obviously be nothing more than a prelude to 
the utter destruction of its enemies. The only victories available to the Occidentalists are of the 
Pyrrhic variety. Even should they succeed in setting the world ablaze, life among the ashes will 
be nothing like their dreams. 
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